reworked namecoin post
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title: Namecoin, A Replacement For SSL
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---
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This is a long post, and it could very well be two posts disguised as one. I'm
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first going to make a case for namecoins, explaining what they are and why
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they're better than existing solutions. I'm then going to make a case for why
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and how namecoins could be used to replace SSL (amongst other things).
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At [cryptic.io][cryptic] we are attempting to create a client-side, in-browser
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encryption system where a user can upload their already encrypted content to our
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storage system and be 100% confident that their data can never be decrypted by
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anyone but them.
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On of the main problems with this approach is that the client has to be sure
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that the code that's being run in their browser is the correct code; that is,
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that they aren't the subject of a man-in-the-middle attack where an attacker is
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turning our strong encryption into weak encryption that they could later break.
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A component of our current solution is to deliver the site's javascript (and all
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other assets, for that matter) using SSL encryption. This protects the files
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from tampering in-between leaving our servers and being received by the client.
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Unfortunately, SSL isn't 100% foolproof. This post aims to show why SSL is
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faulty, and propose a solution using.
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# SSL
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SSL is the mechanism by which web-browsers establish an encrypted connection to
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web-servers. The goal of this connection is that only the destination
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web-browser and the server know what data is passing between them. Anyone spying
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on the connection would only see gibberish. To do this a secret key is first
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established between the client and the server, and used to encrypt/decrypt all
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data. As long as no-one but those parties knows that key, that data will never
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be decrypted by anyone else.
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SSL is what's used to establish that secret key on a per-session basis, so that
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a key isn't ever re-used and so only the client and the server know it.
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## Public-Private Key Cryptography
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There exists something called public-private key cryptography. In this system
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person A has a public and a private key. They can give the public key to anyone
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at all that they want to talk with, doing so can't hurt them. They must keep the
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private key secure from everyone but themselves. If they give their public key
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to person B, then person B can use it to create a message that can only be
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decrypted by the private key. Additionaly, person A can sign messages with their
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private key, so that anyone with the public key can verify that the message came
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from person A and that the contents of the message haven't been tampered with.
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There are two problems with public-private key cryptography. First, it's slower
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then normal cryptography where both parties simply share the same key. Second,
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it assumes that the public key given to person B hasn't been tampered with. If
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person C intercepted A's message to B and instead gave B a different public key,
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then when B encrypted a message with that key C would be able to read it instead
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of A.
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## How does SSL work?
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SSL is at its heart a public-private key system. The client uses the server's
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public key to send the server an encrypted message with the symmetric key it
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wants to use. Since it's only used in the initial setup of the connection to
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negotiate a symmetric key the speed isn't as much of a factor. But getting the
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client the server's public key is.
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SSL uses a trust-chain to verify that a public key is the intended one. Your web
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browser has a built-in set of public keys, called the root certificates, that it
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implicitly trusts. These root certificates are managed by a small number of
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companies designated by some agency who decides on these things. These companies
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sign intermediate certificates for intermediary companies. These intermediary
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companies then sign certificates for websites to serve with SSL. So when you get
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a servers SSL certificate (its public key) you also get the signing chain. Your
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browser sees that the server's key is signed by an intermediate public key, and
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that that intermediate public key is signed by one of the root public keys. As
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long as all signatures check out, the public key for the server you're talking
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to also checks out.
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## How SSL doesn't work
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SSL has a few glaring problems. One, it implies we trust the companies holding
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the root certificates to not be compromised. If some malicious agency was to get
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ahold of a root certificate they could man-in-the-middle any connection on the
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internet they came across. They could trivially steal any data we send on the
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internet. Alternatively, the NSA could, [theoretically][nsa], get ahold of a
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root certificate and do the same.
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The second problem is that it's expensive. Really expensive. If you're running a
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business you'll have to shell out about $200 a year to keep your SSL certificate
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signed (those signatures have an expiration date attached, of course). Since
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there's very few root authorities there's an effective monopoly on signatures,
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and there's nothing we can do about it. For 200 bucks I know most people simply
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say "no thanks" and go unencrypted. The solution is causing the problem.
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# Bitcoins
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This post is about namecoins. But namecoins are based on bitcoins, so you need
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to know how those work first.
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Time to switch gears, and propose a solution to the above issues: namecoins. I'm
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going to first talk about what namecoins are, how they work, and why we need
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them. To start with, namecoins are based on bitcoins.
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If you haven't yet checked out bitcoins, [I highly encourage you to do so][0].
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They're awesome, and I think they have a chance of really changing the way we
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think of and use money in the future. At the moment they're still a bit of a
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novelty in the tech realm, but they're growing in popularity.
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If you haven't yet checked out bitcoins, [I highly encourage you to do
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so][bitcoins]. They're awesome, and I think they have a chance of really
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changing the way we think of and use money in the future. At the moment they're
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still a bit of a novelty in the tech realm, but they're growing in popularity.
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The rest of this post assumes you know more or less what bitcoins are, and how
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they work.
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@ -50,7 +129,7 @@ DHT stands for Distributed Hash-Table. I'm not going to go too into how they
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work, but suffice it to say that they are essentially a distributed key-value
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store. Like namecoin. The difference is in the operation. DHTs operate by
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spreading and replicating keys and their values across nodes in a P2P mesh. They
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have [lots of issues][1] as far as security goes, the main one being that it's
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have [lots of issues][dht] as far as security goes, the main one being that it's
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fairly easy for an attacker to forge the value for a given key, and very
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difficult to stop them from doing so or even to detect that it's happened.
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@ -110,79 +189,14 @@ what they can or can't change with regards to the behavior of the chain, since
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improving performance for one use-case may hurt the performance of the other.
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With two separate chains the maintainers of each are free to do what they see
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fit to keep their respective chains operating as smoothly as possible.
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Additionally, if for some reason bitcoins fall out of favor and fall by the
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wayside, namecoin will still have a shot at continuing operation since it isn't
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tied to the former. Tldr: separation of concerns.
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# SSL
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Time to switch gears. SSL is the mechanism by which web-browsers establish an
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encrypted connection to web-servers. The goal of this connection is that only
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the destination web-browser and the server know what data is passing between
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them. Anyone spying on the connection would only see gibberish. To do this a
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secret key is first established between the client and the server, and used to
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encrypt/decrypt all data. As long as no-one but those parties knows that key,
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that data will never be decrypted by anyone else.
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SSL is what's used to establish that secret key on a per-session basis, so that
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a key isn't ever re-used and so only the client and the server know it.
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## Public-Private Key Cryptography
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There exists something called public-private key cryptography. In this system
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person A has a public and a private key. They can give the public key to anyone
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at all that they want to talk with, doing so can't hurt them. They must keep the
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private key secure from everyone but themselves. If they give their public key
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to person B, then person B can use it to create a message that can only be
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decrypted by the private key. Additionaly, person A can sign messages with their
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private key, so that anyone with the public key can verify that the message came
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from person A and that the contents of the message haven't been tampered with.
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There are two problems with public-private key cryptography. First, it's slower
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then normal cryptography where both parties simply share the same key. Second,
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it assumes that the public key given to person B hasn't been tampered with. If
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person C intercepted A's message to B and instead gave B a different public key,
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then when B encrypted a message with that key C would be able to read it instead
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of A.
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## How does SSL work?
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SSL is at its heart a public-private key system. The client uses the server's
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public key to send the server an encrypted message with the symmetric key it
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wants to use. Since it's only used in the initial setup of the connection to
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negotiate a symmetric key the speed isn't as much of a factor. But getting the
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client the server's public key is.
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SSL uses a trust-chain to verify that a public key is the intended one. Your web
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browser has a built-in set of public keys, called the root certificates, that it
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implicitly trusts. These root certificates are managed by a small number of
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companies designated by some agency who decides on these things. These companies
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sign intermediate certificates for intermediary companies. These intermediary
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companies then sign certificates for websites to serve with SSL. So when you get
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a servers SSL certificate (its public key) you also get the signing chain. Your
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browser sees that the server's key is signed by an intermediate public key, and
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that that intermediate public key is signed by one of the root public keys. As
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long as all signatures check out, the public key for the server you're talking
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to also checks out.
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## How SSL doesn't work
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SSL has a few glaring problems. One, it implies we trust the companies holding
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the root certificates to not be compromised. If some malicious agency was to get
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ahold of a root certificate they could man-in-the-middle any connection on the
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internet they came across. They could trivially steal any data we send on the
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internet. Alternatively, the NSA could, [theoretically][2], get ahold of a root
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certificate and do the same.
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The second problem is that it's expensive. Really expensive. If you're running a
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business you'll have to shell out about $200 a year to keep your SSL certificate
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signed (those signatures have an expiration date attached, of course). Since
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there's very few root authorities there's an effective monopoly on signatures,
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and there's nothing we can do about it. For 200 bucks I know most people simply
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say "no thanks" and go unencrypted. The solution is causing the problem.
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Additionally, if for some reason bitcoins fall by the wayside, namecoin will
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still have a shot at continuing operation since it isn't tied to the former.
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Tldr: separation of concerns.
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# Namecoin as an alternative to SSL
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And now to tie it all together.
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There are already a number of proposed formats for standardizing how we store
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data on the namecoin chain so that we can start building tools around it. I'm
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not hugely concerned with the particulars of those standards, only that we can,
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@ -212,6 +226,20 @@ that it's run by a centralized agency that we have to pay arbitrarily high fees
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to. By switching our DNS and SSL infrastructure to use namecoin we could kill
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two horribly annoying, monopolized, expensive birds with a single stone.
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[0]: http://vimeo.com/63502573
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[1]: http://www.globule.org/publi/SDST_acmcs2009.pdf
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[2]: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/new_nsa_leak_sh.html
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That's it. If we use the namecoin chain as a DNS service we get security almost
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for free, along with lots of other benefits. To make this happen we need
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cooperation from browser makers, and to standardize on a simple way of
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retrieving DNS information from the chain that the browsers can use. The
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protocol doesn't need to be very complex, I think HTTP/REST should suffice,
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since the meat of the data will be embedded in the JSON value on the namecoin
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chain.
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If you want to contribute or learn more please check out [namecoin][nmc] and
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specifically the [d namespace proposal][dns] for it.
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[cryptic]: http://cryptic.io
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[bitcoins]: http://vimeo.com/63502573
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[dht]: http://www.globule.org/publi/SDST_acmcs2009.pdf
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[nsa]: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/new_nsa_leak_sh.html
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[nmc]: http://dot-bit.org/Main_Page
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[dns]: http://dot-bit.org/Namespace:Domain_names_v2.0
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